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GREEN PROPERTY
J Peter Byrne*
The past two decades have witnessed the emergence of ecologi-
cal preservation as a political value of the first magnitude. As citi-
zens have learned how relentless industrialism damages current
public health, future generations, and our biological heritage, demo-
cratic mechanisms have produced curbs on obvious and gross
abuses. For some, the spectacle of waste bred by frank materialism
has led to further reflections on the connections among environ-
mental degradation, acquisitive individualism, and an inane mass
culture. From these reflections have developed the various shades
of green political thought that offer a hopeful alternative to the in-
creasingly irrelevant contexts of right and left.,
Ecological perspectives on human activity have so far had a
marginal influence on the fundamental postulates of American law.
This essay begins an effort to imagine legal principles that further
ecological values and to criticize extant principles that embody the
antithetical values of exploitation and consumption.
I will focus on the transformation of property law inherent in
adopting an environmentally sustainable land use program. The
Rehnquist Court likely will find itself confronted by ever more ag-
gressive public control over land use, because a radical transforma-
tion of land use patterns is necessary to stem environmental
degradation and to promote a civic urban life. The shape of such a
transformation is only barely hinted at here, but I attempt to articu-
late a few basic postulates of green property and contrast it with the
assumptions about constitutional property contained in the promi-
nent takings opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.
These opinions may provide a doctrinal basis for the Court to check
land use reforms through Constitutional nullification, as earlier con-
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servative courts stalled the adoption of social welfare and economic
regulation measures. My larger purposes are to give legal voice to
green politics and to measure its distance from conservative
orthodoxy.
Green political thought resists easy summary because it is vari-
ous and unsystematic. It spans a spectrum from a mild preference
for preserving sites of unusual natural beauty to violent assertions of
animal rights. The unifying theme is a refusal to treat the natural
world as a commodity subject to human domination. Rather, a
thoroughgoing green insists on respecting the moral autonomy of
nature and seeks to live in a manner that promotes ecological bal-
ance. Greens draw from the extinction of species and the pollution
of air, water and countryside an explanatory myth of human greed
and insolence that threaten destruction to all known life. Accord-
ingly, greens reject politics based on individual self-interest and
measures of social welfare based on individual wealth. Taken as a
whole, green political thought represents as different a vision of
human society from liberal capitalism as do feudalism and
socialism.
The strength of these political ideas is difficult to gauge. Some
mild version of them seems ubiquitous. Polls demonstrate the pri-
ority people in industrial nations place on clean air and water and
on the preservation of animal species and open space. Recent polit-
ical victories, such as the shelving of the Two Forks dam in Colo-
rado, the outlawing of the ivory trade, the adoption of a natural
burn policy at Yellowstone by the Parks Service, and the prolifera-
tion of recycling laws (even in New York City) testify to the polit-
ical power of environmentalism. Many who support these
decisions, however, do so without drawing fundamental principles
from what they may view as practical cures for the minor blemishes
of consumer capitalism. They may reject as hysterical total bans on
pesticides, elimination of automobiles, and radical decentralization
of political and economic life. In a world where George Bush, too,
is an environmentalist, green views are indispensable but still
marginal.
Nevertheless, the prospect for movement toward a green per-
spective appears excellent, if for no happier reason than that our
present obsession with producing more unnecessary "wealth" will
continue to cause frightening harms to the natural environment.
Conscious articulation of green ideas can make familiar the
unimaginable. Green political groups have directed attention to the
more far-reaching implications of ecological values and to the fam-
ily relationships among greens, feminists, peace activists, and the
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dispossessed of the Third World. Die Grunen, the West German
green party, demonstrates the potential political might (and inevita-
ble pitfalls) of organized radical ecologists.2
Environmental concerns have become a significant influence on
the goals of American land use law. For example, recent critical-
areas regulations severely regulate development in areas of sensitive
natural value such as coastlines and watersheds.3 These regulations
impose the most extensive controls on development of private land
in our history. They do so to safeguard the natural functions of
estuaries, coastlines, and wetlands upon which both sustainable eco-
nomic activity such as fishing, and organic life itself depend. Also,
they affirm the intrinsic worth of the Earth and call on us to restrain
our cupidity as the minimum condition of self-esteem. Such regula-
tions reduce the market value of affected land by curtailing indus-
trial development, severely restricting residential densities, and
imposing new restrictions on agricultural methods. Indeed, conver-
sion of the site from an economic commodity to a functioning part
of a healthy environment may be said to be the objective of the
regulation.
Regulation so pervasive challenges fundamental assumptions
concerning property in land. Our land law has stood on the twin
bases that the owner ought to have extensive discretion over the use
of land and that land ought to be put to its most profitable use.
These potentially contradictory assumptions are reconciled in the
person of the hypothetical rational owner whose fate is to pile up
wealth tirelessly. American land use law has expressed these ideo-
logical assumptions. Courts justified zoning as a means to increase
the total market value of a community's land, by eliminating mar-
ket depressing incompatible uses, and by preserving the right of
each owner to develop his parcel of land in a profitable manner.
Zoning regulations that failed to protect these interests of the land-
owner were said to "take" the owner's property.
As land regulation has increased, courts generally have found
ways to sustain the regulations against complaints that owners'
property had been taken. Most conspicuously, they have pushed
back the economic limits imposed by the takings clause to the point
2. Die Grunen received 8.3 percent of the vote in the 1987 West German parliamen-
tary elections and currently have forty-two MP's. The party has experienced intense inner
controversy between "realos" and "fundis" over the question of whether to make the neces-
sary compromises to become a participant in governing.
3. A recent example is Maryland's Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Act, MD. NAT. RES.
CODE ANN. § 8-1801 (Supp. 1987). The Act created a Critical Area's Commission empow-
ered to coordinate land use regulations over 600,000 acres of land along the Bay and its
tributaries among sixty local jurisdictions. In most of the area within 1000 feet of the shore-
line the Act restricts residential density to one residence per twenty acres.
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where the owner usually can prevail only if he can make no eco-
nomic use of the land. While permitting government to control
land use, this change preserves the principle that an owner is enti-
tled to investment income from her land.
This principle itself is no longer unquestioned. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin wrote in Just v. Marinette County nearly twenty
years ago: "An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right
to change the essential natural character of his land so as to use it
for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and
which injures the rights of others."4 Hedged about as this is with
qualifications, it strikes the true green note. It recognizes that land
development can impose enormous costs on others; the owner has
no more right to diminish water quality through filling wetlands
than through pumping phosphates into a river. Growing under-
standing of the significance of wetlands has taught courts about the
"externalities" that their destruction entails.5 Although Just has
spawned some progeny, whether it will provide the national rule for
"taking" of wetlands remains to be seen. More interesting is
whether improved ecological understandings-showing that current
forms of commercial development harm the environment by weak-
ening the atmosphere, increasing erosion and runoff of nutrients
into waters, and destroying habitats for other organisms--can lead
to a more general conclusion that no one has a presumptive right to
develop land.
Similarly, judicial resuscitation of the public trust doctrine cre-
ated an environmental tool of breathtaking potential. The doctrine
is very powerful because it gives a state, as trustee for the public at
large, an inalienable and overriding property right in certain land
even if privately held. This public right has been held to require
that owners both permit reasonable public access and preserve the
environmental value of the land or water. No takings claim can
prevail when property is subject to a public trust, because the state
4. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1972).
5. Economists, of course, conceive of pollution as costs that the polluter places on
other members of the community, i.e., externalities. The prices of the primary commodities
produced by the polluter do not reflect the entire social cost of its production, thereby remov-
ing incentive to the producer to reduce pollution and causing an inefficiently high consump-
tion of the underpriced commodity. See, eg., A. PoLINsKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW
AND ECONOMICS 89-93 (1983). Thus, for example, the manufacturer of paper diapers does
not bear any of the cost of disposing of the millions of such diapers soiled weekly; the public
bears this cost through taxes supporting municipal waste management. See Menell, Beyond
the Throw-Away Society: An Incentive Approach to Regulate Municipal Solid Waste (forth-
coming in the ECOLOGY L. Rnv. December, 1990). In the context of wetlands filling, pollu-
tion costs imposed on others include lessening of water and air quality, loss of species habitat
and loss of public amenity. Obviously, the attribution of an appropriate share of the genera-
lized harms to any specific fill project is problematic.
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acts pursuant to preexisting property rights rather than police or
eminent domain powers. The primary doctrinal restriction on the
public trust doctrine is the fiction that the modern law has devel-
oped from the prerogatives of the English king, which restricts the
public trust to traditional natural areas such as tidelands and navi-
gable waters. More formidable obstacles lie in the widespread de-
sire of property owners to increase their wealth through
development and in legitimate concerns that extensive public own-
ership will result in a "tragedy of the commons."
These regulatory and doctrinal developments provide the basis
for a green theory of property. Such a theory would seek primarily
to give legal effect to the ecological land ethic, as formulated by
thinkers such as Aldo Leopold, which emphasize the moral duty of
humanity to act as steward of natural life.6 A regulatory program
incorporating this theory might identify land within the jurisdiction
of outstanding natural value and subject it to the following:
1) Any change in the character of land that impairs its natural value would re-
quire a permit.
2) No permit would be granted unless the development served a compelling
human need.
3) If the development appears to cause some specific harm to the environment not
directly forbidden by positive regulations (such as narrowing the habitat of a
diminishing species) it can be permitted only if
a) it will be accomplished with the minimum of environmental damage,
b) the developer will pay in dollars the cost of environmental damage, and
c) the human gains from development substantially exceed the environmental
harm from the project.
4) Reasonable public access must be permitted over any land designated as having
scientific, aesthetic or recreational value.
5) No compensation should be paid landowners for any regulations or denial of
permits under the above regulations if such actions are taken in good faith.
This bare statement of regulatory standards does not begin to ad-
dress the legitimate political concerns about the institutions that
would administer this regime not its collateral effects on harmless
economic activity. The sketch is merely given to suggest the shape
of laws serving ecological rather than utilitarian ends.7
6. See A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC xviii-xix, 237-64 (1966).
7. Utilitarian or economic analysis should not be employed to formulate the goals of
green property law. First, as mentioned above in note 5, economics has done a poor job of
describing the costs of development or the benefits of conservation. Second, such analysis
employs as the criterion of the good the perceived benefit to currently living humans. This is
almost a restatement of the ecological and moral failure that greens address. Cost-benefit
techniques do not adequately capture the damage done to future generations by current re-
source decisions; the future of the planet is not encompassed within current market prices or
discount rates. Such analysis also gives no weight to the rights of non-human organisms. (Of
course, once the decision to count non-human organisms is made, a decision which itself
cannot be justified adequately by human pleasure, utilitarianism may contribute to ecological
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A green theory of property would support a regulatory pro-
gram of land use serving ecological ends of removing impediments
to the exercise of public control.8 Property law embraces society's
allocation of benefits among its members and the boundaries be-
tween private and public control of things. These relational rights
have changed often to reflect changing visions of social order.9
Thus, nineteenth century law sought to disentangle absolute owner-
ship of land from the lingering restrictions of a more communal,
pre-industrial regime dating back to the medieval manor; the pur-
poses of such reform included stimulation of wealth creation, en-
hancement of social mobility, and glorification of individual liberty.
A green property law must thoroughly subject individual rights in
natural resources to the community's need for biological and spiri-
tual vitality; the purposes of such reforms include the preservation
of higher forms of life on earth, the inculcation in humans of moral
self-restraint in consuming resources or exploiting others, and the
enhancement of pleasure and grace from direct experience of the
natural world.
It remains a challenge to articulate these principles in legal
doctrine. The essence of such doctrinal innovation must be that the
individual possessor does not own the right to degrade the natural
ecological systems on his land; such a right must be held by the
jurisdiction in trust for present and future members of the commu-
nity. Such trust should reflect a real fiduciary obligation to other
thinking. See P. SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (2d ed. 1989)). Moreover, economics hinges
on a model of human behavior predicated on individual acquisition of benefits limited only by
the need to compete with other individuals for scarce resources; greens urge the moral neces-
sity to restrain appetite for the good of the ecological community. Finally, ecological respon-
sibility would be morally right even if most people preferred to consume everything they can
appropriate.
None of this means, of course, that economic analysis is not an indispensable tool for
effectuating green policies once those policies have been established on some other basis.
8. See Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial Protection of
the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVIR. L. REv. 311
(1988). Hunter's useful critique is marred by his strange belief that ecological land use deci-
sions involve no value choices but only the direct application of scientific knowledge. This is
plainly false: a people with complete knowledge of environmental sciences might choose to
maximize their present consumption of resources on the plausible assumption that the disas-
trous consequences of this behavior would not materialize until after they were dead. The
rejection of this alternative requires the acceptance of a normative proposition, such as that
we are responsible for the welfare of future generations or that degradation of the environ-
ment is a wrong in itself. Green thought depends on a vision of natural law, a faith that the
deep structures of natural life are beneficent and suggest powerful analogies for human moral
choice.
9. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771-78 (1964). Green property
places individual power over nature under more extensive collective control, while Reich's
new property sought to give the individual more extensive freedom over resources created or
allocated by the state. Although they move in opposite directions along a single continuum
from individual to collective power, they do not conflict in principle.
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species of life. Joined with such public beneficial ownership of natu-
ral ecological systems should be a right of reasonable access by the
public to worthwhile natural sites. This formula essentially extends
the present public trust doctrine to all undeveloped and agricultural
land, while severing it from the historical fictions that sometimes
have sustained it.
While no legislature will adopt such a program tomorrow, new
land regulatory measures may well tend in his direction. A poten-
tial obstacle to such development, however, is the authority of the
Supreme Court to freeze the definition of property in its current
form through interpretation of the takings clause. The Court can
impede the evolution of property law in deciding whether a com-
plainant's economic interest amounts to property and in deciding
whether the degree of governmental control amounts to a taking. A
conservative Court could retard substantially the development of
green land use regulation by finding that representative laws violate
the Constitution. Opinions written by both Chief Justice Rehnquist
and by Justice Scalia suggest that such concerns are real.
The Court in the still recent Nollan case raised the standard by
which courts must evaluate the constitutionality of land use restric-
tions that condition development on the cession of property
rights.10 Also, Justice Rehnquist has argued (for four members of
the Court) that state statutes which prohibit externalities must pass
de novo review under an unspecified federal nuisance standard to
avoid being struck down.11 One might justify closer judicial scru-
tiny in these cases because of the explicit constitutional command
against uncompensated takings of private property. But these same
judges have long told us that property rights are defined by state
law; if state law defines private property rights narrowly, federal
judicial invalidation must imply a constitutional standard for what
is property. The elaboration of such a standard could create a fear-
ful weapon of reaction against ecological land use regulation. I will
briefly review a few corners of doctrine to assess the gravity of this
threat.
First, Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Centrall2 represents a near
complete identification of property with economic development op-
10. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). In that case, Justice
Scalia also pointed at a nonpositivist basis for property in his pregnant comment that "the
right to build on one's own property... cannot remotely be described as a 'government
benefit.'" Id. at 682 n.2. See Williams, Legal Discourse, Social Vision and the Supreme
Court's Land Use Planning Law: The Genealogy of the Lochnerian Recurrence in First Eng-
lish Lutheran Church and Nollan, 59 U. CoLo. L. REv. 427 (1988).
11. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 506 (1987) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
12. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 142-43 (1978).
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portunity. In finding that Penn Central's air rights above the termi-
nal were property themselves, he emphasized that the Constitution
protects every traditional interest in possession, use and disposition
of property; prohibition on exercise of any such right amounts to a
taking, unless the prohibition prohibits a nuisance or effects a net
increase of economic value within an area that is shared by the bur-
dened owner. Such analysis is antithetical to green thinking. It ig-
nores the public rights in private property and equates private
ownership with the power to convert a thing to a more profitable
use. Although Penn Central involved preservation of a historic ur-
ban building, Rehnquist's formulation offers obvious barriers to re-
strictions on subdividing farmland or commercially developing
woodlands; he would note only the loss of potential value to the
owner, while ignoring the loss to the quality of public life from the
destruction of landscape.
Yet constitutional formulations protecting the owner's eco-
nomic potential are unlikely to block the greening of property.
Rehnquist's position lost decisively in Penn Central to a position
which, while murky, emphasizes the owner's current use of the ter-
minal and limits his constitutional economic right to a "reasonable"
return on its investment. More importantly, science and public ed-
ucation have made it easier for environmental advocates to articu-
late the harms that development imposes on the public and so
satisfy the nuisance and zoning exceptions to Rehnquist's analysis,
albeit through the dubious enterprise of quantifying externalities.13
Rehnquist's commercial analysis only mirrors in exceptionally
philistine manner our society's concept of land as primarily an eco-
nomic asset rather than a biological or spiritual place. On a Court
so myopic, economic concerns will not abate faster than in society
at large. Green lawyers must find language, marshall facts, and
13. Providing dollar values for natural entities for which there is no market is inevitably
fictive. What is the measure of the loss to a community when a wooded hill above a pond is
stripped of trees and an office center is built? A clever analyst could estimate specious costs
for the polluting effects of increased runoff to the pond from the site and for increased traffic
on existing roads, but nothing acceptable can be offered for the decrease in bird life, the
demoralizing loss of beauty, or the inhabitants' sense of a break with the past. One might
simply say that the wooded hillside is worth what the community would be willing to pay for
the right to prevent development.
What is the value of a species of snail that faces extinction? Apologists for environmen-
tal protection often cite the potential future human value of unique genetic material that each
species contains. Improbabilities and discount factors may reduce the present dollar value of
this application to near zero. Yet such analysis appears quite inadequate because it measures
only the selfish commercial interests of humans. Neither the contribution of the extinction of
one species toward, in combination with other harms, making the earth uninhabitable for
humans nor the loss to non-human organisms from the extinction of another species can be
plausibly measured.
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fashion arguments that can present the case against development in
its most appealing form. The absence of such a legal vision renders
the opinions of Justice Brennan in both Penn Central and Nollan
rather defensive and flacid.
Second, both Justices Rehnquist and Scalia have written pro-
vocative opinions urging the invalidation of land use restrictions as
infringing the liberty of owners. In Fresh Pond Shopping Center,14
Rehnquist dissented from the dismissal of an appeal from a decision
upholding a local rent control agency's prohibition against a corpo-
ration demolishing its apartment building for a parking lot. The
essence of Rehnquist's argument was that the agency constitution-
ally could not "take" the owner's liberty to control the use of its
property; he explicitly put the economic consequences to the owner
to one side and equated the owner's loss of control with a physical
invasion. This individual liberty to manipulate resources must be a
central target of green lawyers because it presupposes mankind's
moral dominion over creation. Such liberty should be granted spar-
ingly to resolve land utilization problems that complete community
control might exacerbate. The private owner might be thought of
as an agent of the community, who is rewarded for his efforts with a
limited equity interest.
The equation of property with liberty also plays a prominent
role in Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n,15 which struck down the imposition of a condi-
tion to expansion of a beach house that the owners permit the pub-
lic to walk down the beach. Scalia put economic losses to the
owners to one side and concentrated on the loss of personal domin-
ion that comes from the inability to exclude others. He said little
about the economic character of the Nollan's loss, but much about
the "extortion" of trading permission to build for access rights.
Greens should attack directly the proposition that owners may
exclude the public from proximity to the ocean or other special nat-
ural areas. Valuable preparatory work has been accomplished in
elaborating the public trust doctrine to deprive owners in several
states of the right to exclude the public from the wet sand area of
the beach. The courts have contrasted the harmfulness of develop-
ment of an ocean beach with the desirability of public (non-con-
sumptive) enjoyment of that immensely invigorating location.
Greens should argue that experience of ocean shorefront is an ina-
lienable right of all people, surely no less significant than the right
14. Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875 (1983).
15. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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to leaflet a shopping center.16 Without access to nature, humans
lose perspective on their limited claims on creation, their duties of
nurture, and perhaps on the providence of death. Every induce-
ment should be offered to divert citizens from shopping centers and
televisions to woods and shores. Direct knowledge of the natural
world will strengthen public support for responsible policies of
preservation.
The argument for exclusion rests on inertia and selfishness.
Great Britain has retained from the middle ages public rights of
way throughout its countryside. We lack such public rights because
of the sparseness of early American settlements and because our
property law coalesced when land development was the greatest
hope for personal wealth and mobility. Much was sacrificed in the
name of development. What losses would owners suffer from recog-
nition of publicly regulated rights of access on land and water of
special merit? The most persuasive fear is that public access will
create a tragic commons, resulting in destruction through overuse
of the prized resource. But such harms can be contained through
regulation. The Nollans could not have claimed that lateral access
would destroy the beach before their seawall, but they have an in-
terest in prohibiting litter. The owner's pleasure in exclusive do-
minion itself need not be countenanced. Some loss of tranquility
may be suffered, but those who purchase in highly desirable areas
cannot expect complete solitude.
Third, the Justices protect property as a check on governments
unable to pursue a common good other than the organized self-in-
terest of constituents. For example, in his dissent in Pennell v. City
of San Jose,17 Justice Scalia stressed the desirability of requiring
government to pay for benefits taken from property owners in order
to deter inefficient wealth transfers, those the public would not be
willing to pay for given competing needs. This point has some
force, although it commodifies public values (should the Czechs
purchase the right to free elections from the Communist Party?)
and assumes the justice of the initial allocation of entitlements.
Greens must believe that reorientation of society to protection of
the earth represents a more fundamental moral change than simply
the ascendancy of a new interest group: they aspire to the abandon-
ment of individual self-interest as a basis for social organization.
16. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (California constitu-
tional provision that permits people to distribute pamphlets and solicit signatures on a peti-
tion at a shopping center does not take owner's property rights in violation of fourteenth
amendment). See also State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969) (up-
holding public access to beaches based on custom).
17. 485 U.S. 1, 15 (1988).
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Similarly, greens reject the political economy function of compensa-
tion because ecological balance is a good independent of whether it
is preferred by the majority: even if a majority of voters would not
support the purchase of an ecological balance, it should be done.
Indeed, many voters suffer from consciousness "polluted" by the
ceaseless manipulation and organized prurience of a consumer
media.
Greens have only begun to think about the political institutions
that will make these choices. Green groups frequently adopt an in-
ternal decisionmaking procedure that emphasizes mutual education
and consensus. Greens resist the careerist politics that typify our
larger institutions. (Die Grunen has insisted, for example, that par-
liamentary representatives rotate out of office every few years.)
Many also have advocated extensive decentralization of government
to political units reflecting the boundaries of natural ecosystems
(such as the Appalachians), a movement known as bioregional-
ism.18 At the same time greens are committed to disarmament and
international cooperation.
One might criticize this as a dreamy, short-lived utopianism
that threatens to lapse into anarchy or authoritarianism. Yet aban-
doning the vision of overcoming greed and parochialism leaves us
with little hope that we can preserve the earth as sustenance and joy
for our children. Science has assembled an impressive array of in-
formation about threats from air pollution, toxic waste, climactic
change, water pollution, extinction of species, and population
growth.19 Perhaps under the shadow of disaster an informed citi-
zenry can achieve public virtue. Preservation of the prerogatives of
property owners will not address these issues.
The opinions of Scalia and Rehnquist suggest that a radical
transformation of property law to reflect ecological values would
encounter judicial resistance. Such resistance would not be different
in kind from the types of resistance greens should expect at every
level of public decisionmaking. The law is wedded to a concept of
property that gives precedence to a right to change the existing bio-
logic character of land over increases in the owner's individual
wealth. The constitutional shibboleths of the Justices could freeze
the fluid stream of property law in the posture of acquisitive indi-
vidualism. The task of green property law is both to find practical
mechanisms for utopian aspirations and to criticize those elements
of the legal culture that obstruct urgent reforms.
18. See K. SALE, DWELLERS IN THE LAND (1985).
19. The September 1989 issue of SCIENiFIc AMERICAN is devoted to recapitulation of
what scientists understand about the process and extent of environmental degradation.
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